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Non-Technical Summary
This paper attempts to assess the Europe-wide systemic risk in banking. Systemic
risk is one of the main reason why banks are regulated and supervised. The failure of
a specific bank may trigger a chain reaction of bank failures and generate negative
externalities for the whole banking system. In addition, systemic financial events
may induce undesirable negative real effects, such as substantial reductions in output
and employment. In Europe banking regulation and in particular supervision is
organised at a national level. However, increased systemic risk at the European level
may call for a reform of the European supervisory framework. A bank failure in one
country could potentially trigger further failures not only in the same country but
also in other countries. The current nation-based system may then incorporate the
danger that a national banking supervisor would possibly undervalue or even
disregard such a cross-border contagion effect. Thus, a single European supervisor
or at least strong co-ordination among national supervisors could be needed. In order
to discuss a future institutional structure for the supervision of banks in the EU it is
of crucial importance to know about the actual threat of systemic risk in European
banking. This paper attempts to contribute toward this direction.
As a measure of systemic risk we use the conditional correlations between pairs of
national bank stock indices of the EU countries. The correlations are estimated using
bivariate GARCH-models which consider the influence of the national stock market
index and a short-term interest rate as explanatory factors. The correlations measure
the linear relationships between the residuals of the GARCH-models and as these
residuals mainly reflect bank specific factors they are suitable to quantify the
systemic risk. We employ three tests to assess the development of Europe-wide
systemic risk. First, we test if the hypothesis of a constant correlation is false.
Second, we test for structural breaks after the completion of the internal banking
market in the EU. Here, we identify two possible dates on which structural breaks
could have occurred: the time after the implementation of the second banking
directive and after the introduction of the Euro. And third, we test the hypothesis of
a gradual increase of the cross-border correlations. We apply these three approaches
to monthly data from 1980 on and to weekly data from 1990 on.
Our main finding is that many conditional correlations exhibit significant upward
changes over time either as parallel shifts at the two specified dates or as linear time
trends. We interpret these results as evidence of an ongoing integration process in
the European banking business which leads to growing similarities in the
international economic factors that drive the profits of the banks. As a consequence
of a more similar business behaviour this is evidence for an increase in systemic risk
in the European banking market.
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Abstract
This paper attempts to assess the Europe-wide systemic risk in banking. We employ
a bivariate GARCH model to estimate conditional correlations between European
bank stock indices. These correlations are used as an indication for the
interdependencies amongst the banking business in Europe and hence for the
systemic risk potential. We employ several tests to assess the development of
systemic risk: a non-parametric test of constancy of the correlation, a test of parallel
shifts in the correlation at pre-specified events, and a test for a linear time trend in
the correlations. The results show that many of the conditional correlations exhibit
an upward move in the last years. This is an indication that the economic factors
determining the European banking business have become more similar and that the
systemic risk potential has increased.
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11 Motivation
Systemic risk is one of the main reason why banks are regulated and supervised.
The failure of a specific bank may trigger a chain reaction of bank failures and
generate negative externalities for the whole banking system. In addition,
systemic financial events may induce undesirable negative real effects, such as
substantial reductions in output and employment.
In Europe banking regulation and in particular supervision is organised at a
national level. However, increased systemic risk at the European level may call
for a reform of the European supervisory framework. Integration of financial
markets in Europe has increased rapidly not just since the introduction of the
Euro. This development may have increased interdependencies among financial
institutions of different countries which in turn may have led to a rise in the
potential of cross-border contagion, i.e. systemic risk at a European level. If this
is true a bank failure in one country could potentially trigger further failures not
only in the same country but also in other countries. The current nation-based
system may then incorporate the danger that a national banking supervisor
would possibly undervalue or even disregard such a cross-border contagion
effect. Thus, a single European supervisor or at least strong co-ordination among
national supervisors could be needed.1 Just recently, the discussion of the
appropriate institutional structures and mechanisms in the European Union (EU)
has intensified. The discussion resulted in a proposal by the Economic and
Financial Committee (EFC) to the Council of the EU that will probably lay the
basis for a future supervisory structure in the EU.2
In order to discuss a future institutional structure for the supervision of banks in
the EU it is of crucial importance to know about the actual threat of systemic
risk in European banking. This paper attempts to contribute toward this
direction. We employ a bivariate GARCH model to estimate correlations
between European bank stock indices. These correlations are used as an
indication for the interdependencies among European banks and hence for the
systemic risk potential. We employ three tests to assess the development of
Europe-wide systemic risk. First, we test if the hypothesis of a constant
correlation is false. Second, we test for structural breaks after the completion of
the internal banking market in the EU. Here, we identify two possible dates on
                                          
1 The question that arises is whether the potential of systemic risk may be even world-wide
and not just Europe-wide. The analysis in this paper is motivated from banking supervision
that – at least in the short and medium run – will not be organised at a world-wide level.
Thus, we merely analyse the potential of systemic risk at the European level and do not ask
whether there may be also contagion between European and non-European banks.
2 For a discussion of this proposal see, e.g., Schüler (2003).
2which structural breaks could have occurred: the time after the implementation
of the second banking directive and after the introduction of the Euro. And third,
we test the hypothesis of a gradual increase of the cross-border correlations.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 defines systemic risk and gives a
brief review of the empirical literature. Section 3 presents the methodology and
data employed. The empirical results are given in section 4. Finally, section 5
concludes.
2 Systemic Risk in the Banking Market
2.1 The Concept of Systemic Risk
In general the banking or the financial sector is viewed as more vulnerable to
contagion than other industries since banks are viewed as more susceptible to
failures (Kaufman 1995, 1996, Goodhart et al., 1998, de Bandt and Hartmann,
2000). In this sense, banks are special for several reasons: One reasons lies in
the structure of the banks. Banks are vulnerable to runs due to fractional reserve
banking, i.e. in the case of high withdrawals the banks may not be able to fulfil
deposit obligations. Furthermore, banks are highly leveraged, i.e. they have a
low capital-to-assets ratio. Thus there is only little room for losses. In addition,
they exhibit low cash-to-assets ratios which may require the sale of earning
assets to meet deposit obligations. Furthermore banks are highly interconnected
through direct exposures in the interbank money market, the large-value
payment and security settlement systems. These characteristics of the
international banking business give reasons for concerns about systemic risk
across countries.
There exists, however, no unique definition of systemic risk in the literature.
Loosely speaking, systemic risk means “the risk or probability of breakdowns in
an entire system, as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or components”
(Kaufman and Scott, 2000: 1). Systemic risk can occur in banking as well as in
other parts of the financial sector, e.g. in payment and settlement systems or in
securities markets – in financial markets in general. Furthermore, there is
consensus on the existence of different channels through which systemic risk
can occur in banking. Instead of giving a comprehensive definition of systemic
risk these different channels are discussed in order to explain the concept of
systemic risk in banking.3
                                          
3 The definitions for systemic risk given so far all refer to one or more parts of this whole
concept of systemic risk. For a comprehensive definition of systemic risk see de Bandt and
Hartmann (2000).
3There are two ways in which systemic risk can occur in the banking market
(Staub, 1999). First, a macro shock can simultaneously have adverse effects on
several banks. Such a macro shock can either be a cyclical downturn or other
aggregate shocks like interest rate or exchange rate shocks or a stock market
crash.
Second, systemic risk can occur as a result of contagion in the banking market,
i.e. an initial shock causes one bank to fail which subsequently leads to the
failure of other banks (“micro channel”). Such contagion in banking can work
through two channels (de Bandt and Hartmann, 2000): the exposure channel and
the information channel. The former results from real exposures in the interbank
market and/or in payment systems. Thus, insolvency problems of one bank can
trigger a chain reaction leading to other bank failures. This channel refers to the
so called “domino effect”. The information channel, in contrast, refers to ways
through which bad news from one bank lead to the conclusion in the market that
other banks are also in trouble. This will lead to adjustments of contracts with
other partners or – on the depositor level – to contagious withdrawals (bank
runs). A central concept of this channel is that depositors and also other
counterparties have only imperfect information about (a) the type of shocks
hitting a bank, i.e. whether it is idiosyncratic or systemic and (b) the real
exposures to other banks.
In this paper the focus is on the micro channel of systemic risk. Thus, in the
context of this paper a macroeconomic shock that causes several banks to fail is
not regarded as systemic risk. This view is in line with the definitions of
systemic risk given, for example, by Kaufman (1995)4 or the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS). Furthermore, it should be stressed that systemic
risk can be viewed as an immanent threat to the international banking business
that is not confined to only a crisis situation. Thus, in our definition systemic
risk increases when the economic factors that drive the banking business
become more similar across countries.
2.2 Review of the Literature
There is a wide theoretical literature on systemic risk starting from the classical
bank run models following Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and extensions of these
                                          
4 Kaufman (1995: 47) defines systemic or contagion risk as “the probability that cumulative
losses will occur from an event that sets in motion a series of successive losses along a
chain of institutions or markets comprising a system.”
4models of single banks’ fragility to models of multiple bank systems, leading to
the modern bank contagion literature.5
Also, there are empirical studies on systemic risk and contagion in the banking
sector that utilise several different approaches. The predominant part of these
studies examine specific bank failures of the past either by looking at
intertemporal correlations of bank failures or by doing event studies.6 Since
today – i.e. in times of deposit insurance’s and lenders of last resort – bank runs
and accumulated bank failures do not actually occur in industrial countries such
methods can not be applied in order to empirically examine systemic risk. Also
the use of historical data – for example from the free banking era in the United
States – is not appropriate when assessing the actual threat of systemic risk and
contagion in banking. Hence, an indicator for the potential of systemic risk is
needed.
Focusing exclusively on the potential threat stemming from interbank lending,
i.e. on the exposure channel of systemic risk one approach is to directly examine
exposures in the interbank market and simulate contagious effects following the
hypothetical failure of one bank. There are some studies for the US that use this
approach utilising data, for example, from the Federal Reserve’s large-value
transfer system, Fedwire, or the Clearinghouse Interbank Payments System
(CHIPS) (Kaufman, 1994, Humphrey, 1986, Furfine, 1999). For Europe,
Michael (1998), reports some exposures from London interbank markets,
Angelini et al. (1996) from the Italian netting system, and Sheldon and Maurer
(1998) base their simulations on accounting data drawn from banks that operate
in Switzerland. All of these studies report a relatively small threat to financial
market stability from the failure of one bank. Unfortunately, for whole Europe
data on interbank lending is only available on an aggregate level which does not
allow for statements concerning contagion risk between individual banks.
In contrast to former studies our study attempts to assess the threat of systemic
risk in an international context.7 In particular, the aim is to measure changes in
the systemic risk in the European banking market. For this purpose, we employ
a bivariate GARCH model with constant correlation to estimate the conditional
correlation between pairs of bank stock indices for the European countries.
                                          
5 For a good survey on the theoretical as well as the empirical literature on systemic risk see
de Bandt and Hartmann (2000).
6 See, for example, Aharony and Swary (1983), Swary (1986), Schoenmaker (1996), Slovin et
al. (1999), Bessler and Nohel (2000), Akhigbe and Madura (2001).
7 Of course there is the financial crisis literature that looks at cross-border contagion (see, e.g.,
Dornbusch et al., 2000). But their focus is primarily on currency or debt crisis.
52.3 Correlations of Bank Stock Returns as a Measure of Systemic
Risk
De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) argue that estimation of the systemic risk potential
may be achieved using a measure of the interdependencies of financial
institutions. For an economic shock to become systemic a negative externality
must exist, i.e. a negative shock at a single bank must be highly likely to have
contagious effects on other banks. Only if the banks are interdependent in some
way such an externality exists – i.e. there is the threat of systemic risk. Such
interdependencies can be either direct, i.e. through direct exposures or indirect,
i.e. they arise from correlated exposures to non-financial sectors and financial
markets.
De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) measure total interdependencies by the correlations
of stock returns of large banking organisations. Since stock prices reflect market
participants’ collective evaluation of a firms prospects in the future they should
also include the impact of the firms interdependencies with other institutions.8
Consequently one can assume that an observed increase in correlations amongst
bank stock returns signals an increase in the systemic risk potential. No change
in correlations or a decrease would therefore lead to the conclusion that the
potential of systemic risk has not increased or has declined.
In this paper we do not use individual bank stock returns but rather national
stock indices for the banking sector that represent the prospects of the banking
industry in a country. We estimate correlations between pairs of excess bank
stock index returns of European countries using a bivariate GARCH model.
Certainly, in an international context we have to consider a few more things.
Estimating correlations between pairs of bank stock indices without controlling
for common factors could result in incorrect conclusions with respect to
interdependencies and, hence, the systemic risk potential. An increase in
correlations may result merely from an increase in the comovement between the
underlying common factors which has nothing to do with the development of
systemic risk.
The empirical literature on the explanatory factors of bank stock returns has
shown that the inclusion of an interest rate factor adds substantial explanatory
power to the single-factor market model.9 The interest rate variable is important
                                          
8 A quite similar consideration was already made by Pozdena (1991) who regressed the stock
returns of various individual banks on each other in each period in order to get evidence for
contagious effects.
9 See, e.g., Stone (1974), Flannery and James (1984a,b), Aharony et al. (1986), Sweeney and
Warga (1986), Yourougou (1990), Benink and Wolff (2000).
6for the valuation of stocks of financial institutions because the accounting
returns and costs of financial institutions are directly related to changes in
interest rates.10 The concrete interest rate sensitivity depends on the individual
characteristics of the bank’s asset and liability positions.
As a consequence, we include two common factors in the return equations of the
bivariate GARCH model: the excess return of the national stock market index
and a short-term interest rate. By excluding the influence of these two identified
factors we analyse only that part of the excess bank stock index returns which is
explained by the risk exposure to bank specific factors. The international
correlations of these factors, for example, comprise the exposure to other banks
(e.g. due to inter-bank lending) or the interdependencies to other banks via third
companies. In short, these (unidentified) factors should comprise the potential
for systemic risk. We measure the correlation of these bank specific factors and
apply different tests for changes in the correlation. In our approach a change in
the correlation is equivalent to a change in the systemic risk between the
banking sectors of two countries.
3 Methodology and Data
The aim of our study is to measure changes in the systemic risk in the European
banking industry. Our main method to estimate systemic risk is the bivariate
GARCH model with constant correlation. This gives us an estimate of the
conditional correlation between each pair of bank stock indices for the European
countries.
The bivariate GARCH model consists of five equations: the first two equations
define the excess returns of the bank stock indices (rB1 and rB2) and the
following two equations the time-varying variances. The last equation is used to
estimate the constant correlation corr.
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The residuals (t) are assumed to follow a bivariate distribution with variance-
covariance matrix t):
                                          
10 An additional important argument in favour of the inclusion of the interest rate variable is
that within EMU the convergence – and after the introduction of the Euro the equality – of
money market rates would lead to an increase in the correlations of unadjusted stock
returns.
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The variances ( 2 21 2( ), ( )B Bt t  ) follow a GARCH (1,1)-process11 and the
covariances 1, 2 ( )B B t  are simply the product of the correlation and the two time-
varying variances.
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In (1) the excess returns of the bank stock indices depend on the excess returns
of the national stock market index (rM) and a short-term interest rate (is). In
addition, the use of the bank index of period (t-1) captures a first-order
autocorrelation. Thus, the residuals () measure those part of the bank stock
returns which are not explained by the risk exposures to the total market and
short-term interest rates. As pointed out above, the inclusion of these two factors
is crucial for our analysis. A higher correlation between bank stock returns that
is explained by stronger comovements between the national stock indices does
not tell us anything about systemic risk but is only another measure of the
market-wide comovements on a sectoral level. The short-term interest rates are
an important factor in the return equations as the bank profit is usually interest
rate sensitive. A higher correlation amongst interest rates can therefore lead to
higher correlations amongst bank stock returns. This is particularly important for
an analysis of the EU banking industry as our data sample includes the
convergence process towards the monetary union. Thus, a neglect of the short-
term interest rates would result in an increase in the correlation of the bank stock
indices which were only due to the interest rate convergence.
The residuals measure mainly those parts of the return series that are caused by
specific influences on the banking sectors in Europe. Changes in the conditional
correlation corr can therefore be interpreted as changes in the cross-border risk
of the banking industry.
Equation (3a) estimates the average correlation for the whole sample. The
results of this equation can be used to test the assumption of the constancy of
corr. We apply the non-parametric information matrix (IM) test of Bera and
                                          
11 Experiments with higher order GARCH-processes showed that in our applications only the
GARCH (1,1)-parameters were significantly different from zero.
8Kim (2002) to get first insights into the stability of the correlations. Bera and
Kim develop two test statistics, IMC and IM3. The second test statistic is equal to
the third of three parts of IMC. Both tests do not purely investigate the constancy
of the correlation but are also affected by deviations from normality. As IM3 is
less influenced by deviations from the normal distribution than IMC it is
recommended by Bera and Kim if one is mainly interested in testing the
constancy of the correlation.
The basic versions of the two tests of Bera and Kim assume that the standardised
residuals ( ( ) / ( ))i Bit t   follow a standard normal distribution. As in our
applications the standardised residuals exhibit excess kurtosis we apply the so
called studentised version IM3S which is robust against deviations from
normality.
More important for our analysis are parametric tests of structural breaks and
changes in the correlation. In equation (3b) we include in addition to (3a) two
dummy variables (du1, du2):
(3b) , ( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )B1 B2 B1 B2t corr1 corr2 du1 t corr3 du2 t t t        
The first dummy variable estimates a structural break after the liberalisation of
the market for banking services (2nd EU banking directive) in 1993. To allow for
an adjustment period we test for a structural break at the beginning of 1994.
Thus du1 is zero until December 1993 and one afterwards. The second dummy
variable tests for a break after the start of the European Monetary Union, du2 is
therefore zero until December 1998 and one from January 1999 on. Thus, the
parameter corr1 estimates the correlation from the beginning of the data sample
until December 1993. If corr2 and corr3 are significant these parameters
indicate parallel shifts of the correlation in the periods January 1994 until
December 1998 and January 1999 until the end of the sample.
Both events – the second EU banking directive and the introduction of the euro
– could have increased the correlation amongst bank stock returns as a
consequence of stronger interconnections of the European banking business. To
be more concrete, the 2nd EU banking directive should have increased the
international activities of European banks in other European countries. This
should make the risk and return characteristics of European banks more similar
across countries and as a result should drive correlations upwards. The same
could be true after the launch of the EMU as the common currency reduces the
transaction costs of cross-border banking business.
In addition, we test the hypothesis of a gradual increase of the cross-border
correlations between the banking sectors. In equation (3c) a linear time trend (t)
9is included that accounts for these changes in the correlation of the bank stock
indices:
(3c) , ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )B1 B2 B1 B2t corr4 corr5 t t t      
Whereas equation (3b) is used to investigate the effects of two distinct events on
the correlations, equation (3c) is based on the assumption that the correlations
change gradually over time following a linear trend. As the banking business in
Europe has a tendency to increase the cross-border business we expect a positive
sign of corr5 in equation (3c). For the estimation the trend t has been centred.
Thus, the estimate of corr4 gives the correlation in the middle of the sample
period where t is equal to zero.
All estimations have been conducted using Maximum Likelihood (ML) under
the assumption that the residuals (t) follow a bivariate normal distribution. But
this assumption is in fact not true because in most cases the standardised
residuals exhibit leptokurtosis. Thus, the application of the bivariate normal
distribution leads to a so called Quasi- or Pseudo-ML estimation.12 The standard
errors of the parameters are in addition corrected for (still remaining)
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the approach of Newey and West
(1987).
The Data
We include 13 European countries in the analysis, namely Germany (DE),
Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Ireland
(IE), Italy (IT), The Netherlands (NL), Austria (AU), Portugal (PT), Sweden
(SE) and the United Kingdom (UK). Due to lack of data we dropped Greece and
Luxembourg from the sample of the 15 EU countries. Thus, there result 78 pairs
of countries, i.e. 78 bivariate GARCH estimations. We estimate the above
specified GARCH models using weekly and monthly data. The weekly data are
only available since 1990 on a consistent basis. Thus, we estimate the GARCH-
                                          
12 According to Weiss (1986) this leads to a consistent estimation of the parameters if the
equations for the (conditional) means and variances are specified correctly. But as this
estimator is inefficient in case of non-normal standardised residuals some authors choose a
distribution that takes leptokurtosis explicitly into account. E.g. Hafner (2001) applies the
standardised multivariate t-distribution. However, when a distribution different from the
normal distribution is used and this distribution is not the true distribution then the
estimates are in most cases not consistent (see Newey and Steigerwald, 1997 and,
particularly for the case of an incorrectly assumed t-distribution, Gonzalez-Rivera and
Racine, 1995). Therefore, we prefer to apply the (conditional) normal distribution.
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models also using monthly data which are available since 1980. This is
advantageous particularly with regard to the test of structural break in 1994.13
All data are taken from the Thomson Financial Datastream database. For a list of
the abbreviations see the data appendix. All indices are total return indices in
local currency. Excess returns of the bank stock indices (rB1 and rB2) are then
calculated as the logarithmic differences between two values of the return index
(RI) minus the weekly or monthly based short-term interest rate (is):
( ) log[ ( )] log[ ( 1)] ( 1)Br t RI t RI t is t     .
For the monthly regressions we use the values of the Datastream bank stock
indices at the beginning of each month.14 As market indices we use the MSCI
national monthly gross indices in local currency for calculating the excess
returns of the national stock market indices (rM). Here we take the end-of-the-
month value as the respective value for the following month. As the interest rate
(is) we use the money market rate from the IMF's International Financial
Statistics (line 60b). Here we take the 15th of the month values as the values for
the following month.
For the weekly regressions we use weekly average data. We use again the same
Datastream bank stock indices as for the monthly regressions. For the short-term
interest rate we use a 3-month inter-bank lending rate and for the national stock
market excess return we use the main stock market index of the respective
national stock exchange. For the abbreviations see the data appendix.
4 Empirical Results
In tables 1 and 2, we present a summary of the results of the weekly and
monthly bivariate GARCH estimations. Each table is subdivided into three
sections that present a summary of the results of, first, the tests of correlation
constancy (based on equation (3a)), second, the test for structural breaks
(equation (3b)), and third, the test for a linear trend in the correlations (equation
(3c)). The results are summarised in terms of significance of the parameters.
- insert tables 1 and 2 about here -
                                          
13 Note that for Italy and Portugal the weekly interest rate series are too short to allow for
structural break tests in 1994. As a consequence, we conduct these tests only for 55 pairs of
countries.
14 Using bank stock indices would cause a problem if there were major changes in the
composition of the indices, e.g. due to mergers and acquisitions. Although we do not know
the developments in the composition of the indices, this should not be a problem, since
most mergers and acquisitions involved domestic banks and, in particular, smaller
institutions (ECB Annual Report 2000, p.123).
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For a detailed presentation of all GARCH estimations see tables A1 and A2 in
the appendix where parameter estimates with associated p-values are reported
for all 78 pairs of countries.
Testing Conditional Correlation Constancy
First of all, we apply the Bera and Kim (2002)-test to investigate potential
changes in the conditional correlation corr of equation (3a). The Bera-Kim-test
is a non-parametric test with the null hypothesis of a constant correlation against
an unspecific alternative. Under the null hypothesis the test statistic IM3S of Bera
and Kim asymptotically follows a chi-square distribution with one degree of
freedom. Tables A1 and A2 display the implicit significance level of the test
statistics (= implicit type-I error probabilities) for the 78 pairs of countries. In
the cases where this value is below 0.01/0.05/0.10 we can reject the null at the
respective significance level and conclude that the conditional correlation is not
constant. The tables A1 and A2 in the appendix present the conditional
correlations corr with associated p-values. The first section of tables 1 and 2
summarise these results in terms of significance of the parameters. In these two
tables we take the 0.10 significance level as the relevant one.15
In the weekly regressions, we can reject the null of constancy of the conditional
correlations in only 7 of the 78 cases (= ca. 9%). Using monthly data which start
10 years earlier, the Bera and Kim test statistic rejects the null hypothesis in 24
out of the 78 cases (= ca. 31%). Whereas in the shorter period from 1990 on the
test indicates that correlations between bank stock indices of European countries
have been predominantly stable, the results for the longer period indicate a non-
constancy in more than a quarter of the analysed number of correlations.
For our analysis, i.e. the question whether bank stock indices exhibit a higher
positive correlation, the Bera-Kim test is only of minor importance. A rejection
of the null hypothesis does not tell us in which direction the correlations
changed. Thus, the structural break tests and the estimation of a trend in the
correlations can give us more information about the changes in the correlations.
In addition, these two parametric tests could also be more precise. The Bera-
Kim test is a non-parametric test against an unspecific alternative hypothesis.
Thus, the power of the Bera-Kim test against specific alternatives (parallel
shifts, time trend) might be relatively low. As a consequence, the Bera-Kim test
can only be regarded as a first step in our analysis and the parametric tests are
more important for the questions under consideration.
                                          
15 Note however, that a lot of coefficients are significant at the 0.05 or even 0.01 significance
level.
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Testing for Structural Breaks in Correlations
By estimating equation (3b) we test for structural breaks after the completion of
the EU banking market in the time after the 2nd Banking Directive in 1993, and
after the introduction of the euro in 1999. In tables A1 and A2 in the appendix,
we present the estimated parameters corr1, corr2 and corr3 with associated p-
values for all 78 pairs of countries. If corr2 and corr3 are significant these
parameters indicate parallel shifts of the correlation in the periods Jan. 1994 –
Dez. 1998 or Jan. 1999 – end of the sample. In addition, a Wald-test statistic is
computed that tests for joint significance of corr2 and corr3. Under the null
hypothesis (corr2=corr3=0) this Wald statistic is asymptotically chi-squared
distributed with two degrees of freedom. The second section of tables 1 and 2
give a summary of the results in terms of significance of the parameters.
In the weekly regressions, we find corr2 to be positively significant (at the 10%
level) in 15 of 55 possible combinations (= 27.3%). In only one case corr2 is
negatively significant. Corr3 is significantly positive in 11 cases and
significantly negative in 3 cases. According to the Wald test, they are in 20
regressions jointly significantly different from zero (= 36.4%). In the majority of
these cases (= 85%) the Wald test coincides either with a significantly positive t-
test of corr2 and/or corr3 or with not significant but positive estimates of corr2
and corr3.
In the monthly estimations, we obtain in 23 of the 78 cases (= 29.5%) a
significantly positive and in no single case a significantly negative estimate of
corr2. Corr3 is in 10 regressions significantly positive and in two significantly
negative. In 33 cases they are jointly significant (= 42.3%). Only in one of these
33 cases gives the significant Wald test statistics an indication of a decrease in
the correlation.
Overall, the results of these parametric tests of structural breaks show that the
completion of the single EU banking market and the introduction of the euro
have increased the correlations between European bank stock index returns.
According to our approach the reason for this has been stronger
interdependencies between the banking industries of the European countries.
This gives evidence that these two events have increased the potential for
systemic risk in European banking.
Testing for a Trend in Correlations
By including a time trend in the correlation equation (3c) we are testing whether
the correlations change gradually over time. Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix
show the estimates of the parameters corr4 and corr5 with associated p-values
for the 78 pairs of countries. If corr5 is significantly positive this indicates a
gradual increase of the correlation which we interpret as an increase in the
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interdependencies between banking markets and, hence, an increase in the
systemic risk potential. The third section of tables 1 and 2 summarises these
results in terms of significance of the parameters.
In the weekly regressions, we find the linear time trend in the correlation
equation to be significantly positive in 30 of the 78 pairs of countries (= 38.5%).
In 32 cases it is positive, although not significantly. It is significantly negative
not once, and in 16 pairs negative, but not significantly. The results from the
monthly regressions are quite similar. In 29 cases (= 37.2%) the correlation
increases significantly over time. In no single regression is the linear trend
significantly negative.
The results of this test indicate that correlations between bank stock index
returns of European countries have increased significantly over the last 10 and
20 years. In addition to the results of the test for structural breaks, this gives
further evidence that the systemic risk potential in the EU banking market has
increased over time.
Comparison of the Non-Parametric and the Parametric Tests
There is the question whether results of the three tests in individual pairs of
countries contradict each other. Looking in more detail on the results of the
different tests (tables A1 and A2 in the appendix) we can identify three different
cases:
Firstly, there is the case where the results from the different tests correspond to
each other. This means that for one pair of country the Bera and Kim-test rejects
the null hypothesis of constancy of correlation and we find significant shifts
and/or a significant gradual increase in correlation (case 1a). In case 1b we
classify those cases in which the Bera-Kim-test cannot reject the constancy of
correlation and we find neither shifts nor a gradual increase in correlations.
Case 2 comprise those cases where the Bera-Kim test is significant and both
parametric tests are not significant. Such a result may be explained by a change
in correlations that is neither characterised by a shift nor by a linear trend. An
example might be a sinus-type change in the correlations with a constant
unconditional mean and large fluctuations of the correlations around this mean.
Finally, there is case 3 where the Bera-Kim test does not reject constancy of
correlations, however, the parametric tests indicate a shift and/or a gradual
increase in correlation. This can be explained by the fact that the parametric tests
specify the development of correlations more exactly and, thus, have more
power than the non-parametric Bera and Kim-test.
Table 3 summarises the findings with respect to these three cases.
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- insert table 3 about here -
In the weekly regressions there are 38 pairs of countries where the results of the
Bera and Kim-test correspond to the parametric tests. In 5 regressions the
hypothesis of constancy can be rejected and there is a significant shift and/or a
significant gradual increase in the correlation (case 1a). In 33 regressions neither
is the Bera and Kim-statistic nor the structural breaks nor the time trend
significant (case 1b). Thus, in about 49% the test results are qualitatively equal
indicating altogether either a change in the correlation or a constant correlation.
Case 2, i.e. none of the two parametric tests is significant but the Bera-Kim test
is, applies to only 2 regressions and is therefore negligible. In 38 pairs of
countries we find case 3, i.e. significant shifts and/or a significant trend and no
rejection of constancy of correlation. Thus, in approximately 49% of all cases
the parametric tests indicate a structural change but the Bera-Kim test does not.
Concerning this case we assume that the parametric tests are more reliable and
conclude that a structural change actually occurred.
The comparison of the three tests for the monthly regressions shows the
following. Here we have 16 regressions where the Bera-Kim test rejects the
hypothesis of a constant correlation and there is a significant shift and/or trend
in correlations (case 1a). The higher number of pairs of countries in the monthly
compared to the weekly regressions to which case 1a applies is not surprising: in
the monthly regressions the sample is 10 years longer and thus the probability of
structural changes is also higher. Case 1b occurs 26 times. Therefore, in about
54% the non-parametric and parametric tests find the same qualitative result. In
8 regressions we have case 2, i.e. the Bera and Kim-statistic is significant and
there is neither a significant shift nor a significant gradual increase in
correlation. This applies to ca. 10% of all pairs of countries. In these cases the
correlation has not been constant but the changes are neither equal to a parallel
shift nor to a linear trend. Case 3 applies to 28 of pairs of countries (= ca. 36%).
The majority of the results (= ca. 90%) can be classified into cases 1a,b and 3.
There are only a few regressions where case 2 applies, i.e. where the non-
parametric test indicates a change in correlation and neither of the two
parametric tests indicates such a change. Although, case 2 does not necessarily
constitute a contradiction, it is rather inconvenient and more difficult to explain.
In sum, most of the results of the three tests are consistent with each other.
To sum up, the results of the parametric tests indicate that correlations between
bank stock index returns of European countries have increased over the last 20
years. In only very few cases we have found a significantly negative change. For
example, in 38% of all estimations the time trends in the weekly and monthly
regressions are significantly positive and none are significantly negative. In
addition to the tests of parallel shifts in the correlations at two pre-specified
15
events this gives evidence of an overall increase in the correlations between
European bank stocks. We take this as an evidence that interdependencies
between the European banking industries have become stronger and, hence, the
systemic risk potential in the EU banking market has increased.
5 Conclusions
Has the systemic risk amongst European banking sectors increased over time?
This is the major question we want to answer with this study. The integration
process in the European Union and particularly the development of the single
market and the introduction of the euro are directed towards an increase in the
international business of European industrial companies and banks. An
unintended negative consequence of this integration process might be a rise in
the systemic risk in the European banking business.
As a measure of systemic risk we use the conditional correlations between pairs
of national bank stock indices of the EU countries. The correlations are
estimated using bivariate GARCH-models which consider the influence of the
national stock market index and a short-term interest rate as explanatory factors.
The correlations measure the linear relationships between the residuals of the
GARCH-models and as these residuals mainly reflect bank specific factors they
are suitable to quantify the systemic risk.
We test for changes in the systemic risk by applying three different approaches.
First, we use the Bera and Kim (2002)-test to get an impression of possible
structural breaks. As the Bera-Kim test does not give us information about the
direction of changes in the correlation and has probably low power against
specific alternative hypotheses we mainly use the results of the following two
parametric approaches: (1) test for parallel shifts in the correlations at two
specific events: after the 2nd EU banking directive and after the introduction of
the euro, (2) test for a linear time trend in the correlations.
We apply these three approaches to monthly data from 1980 on and to weekly
data from 1990 on. Our main finding is that many conditional correlations
exhibit significant upward changes over time either as parallel shifts at the two
specified dates or as linear time trends. Overall, the correlations between
European bank stock indices have risen significantly in the last years.
We interpret these results as evidence of an ongoing integration process in the
European banking business which leads to growing similarities in the
international economic factors that drive the profits of the banks. As a
consequence of a more similar business behaviour this is evidence for an
increase in systemic risk in the European banking market.
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Tables
Table 1 – Summary of the results of the weekly bivariate GARCH estimations
significant
positive
positive, but
insignificant
significant
negative
negative, but
insignificant
Testing conditional correlation constancy (equation 3a)
corr
(conditional
correlation)
66 10 0 2
Bera-Kim test1 7 71
Testing for structural breaks in correlations2 (equation 3b)
corr1 8 29 2 16
corr2
(structural break
in 1994)
15 29 1 10
corr3
(structural break
in 1999)
11 25 3 16
Wald test3 20 35
Testing for a trend in correlations (equation 3c)
corr4 63 11 0 4
corr5
(linear trend)
30 32 0 16
Note that 0.10 is taken as the relevant significance level, although a lot of the statistics
and coefficients are significant at the 0.05 or even 0.01 level.
1 The Bera-Kim test does test for the constancy of the correlation, irrespective of the
direction.
2 Note that for Italy and Portugal interest rate series are too short to allow for structural
break tests. As a consequence, we conduct these test only for 55 pairs of countries.
3 Since the Wald statistic is always positive there is no differentiation between positive
and negative changes.
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Table 2 – Summary of the results of the monthly bivariate GARCH estimations
significant
positive
positive, but
insignificant
significant
negative
negative, but
insignificant
Testing conditional correlation constancy (equation 3a)
corr
(conditional
correlation)
64 12 0 2
Bera-Kim test1 24 54
Testing for structural breaks in correlations (equation 3b)
corr1 17 37 3 21
corr2
(structural break
in 1994)
23 44 0 11
corr3
(structural break
in 1999)
10 37 2 29
Wald test2 33 45
Testing for a trend in correlations (equation 3c)
corr4 54 22 0 2
corr5
(linear trend)
29 40 0 9
Note that 0.10 is taken as the relevant significance level, although a lot of the statistics
and coefficients are significant at the 0.05 or even 0.01 level.
1 The Bera-Kim test does test for the constancy of the correlation, irrespective of the
direction.
2 Note that for Italy and Portugal interest rate series are too short to allow for structural
break tests. As a consequence, we conduct these test only for 55 pairs of countries.
3 Since the Wald statistic is always positive there is no differentiation between positive
and negative changes.
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Table 3 – Comparison of the non-parametric and the parametric tests
Cases Weekly
regressions
Monthly
regressions
1a: Bera and Kim significant,
shifts and/or trend significant
5 16
1b: Bera and Kim not significant,
shifts and trend not significant
33 26
2: Bera and Kim significant,
shifts and trend not significant
2 8
3: Bera and Kim not significant,
shifts and/or trend significant
38 28
Sum 78 78
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Data Appendix
Country National bank stock
indices
Market indexes* Short-term interest
rates*
Germany BANKSBD(RI) DAXIDXI FIBOR3M
Belgium BANKSBG(RI) BGBEL20 BIBOR3M
Denmark BANKSDK(RI) DKKFXIN CIBOR3M
Spain BANKSES(RI) IBEX35I ESMIB3M
Finland BANKSFN(RI) HEX25IN FNIBF3M
France BANKSFR(RI) FCAC40C PIBOR3M
Ireland BANKSIR(RI) TOTMKIT EIRED3M
Italy BANKSIT(RI) ISEGNRL ITIBK3M
The Netherlands BANKSNL(RI) AMSTEOE AIBOR3M
Austria BANKSOE(RI) ATXINDX ASVIB3M
Portugal BANKSPT(RI) POPSIGN BBPTE3M
Sweden BANKSSD(RI) SWEDOMX SIBOR3M
United Kingdom BANKSUK(RI) FTSE100 LDNIB3M
The table displays Abbreviations for the respective series drawn from Thomson Financial
Datastream.
* For weekly regressions only.
